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The first lesson the Bush Presidency has taught us about executive 
power is that the topic is exceedingly important. Our conception of 
presidential power matters, and the law of presidential power matters. 
There are two competing models of presidential power. One is a 
unilateral and confrontational vision of presidential power. The other 
is a more accommodationist and cooperative model of the allocation 
of power between the President and the other branches of the federal 
government. 
This dichotomy presents a modern version of the question 
Machiavelli posed five centuries ago: “Is it better for the Prince to be 
loved or feared?”1 In updating Machiavelli’s question, I equate the 
unilateral and confrontational model with “being feared” and the 
accommodationist and cooperative model with “being loved.” 
Machiavelli’s answer was that “it is better to be feared than loved.”2 
More precisely, he asserted it is better to be both feared and loved, 
but such an ideal is not realistically attainable.3 As between the two, 
the prince should prefer being feared to being loved.4 
It is now common to regard the unilateral, confrontational model 
as the pro-presidential view of the Constitution and the more 
accommodationist, cooperative model as the pro-congressional view.5 
 
 * Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. 
 1. Nicoló Machiavelli, THE PRINCE 58–59 (Quintin Skinner & Russell Price, eds., 
Cambridge University Press, 16th ed. 2004) (1532). 
 2. See id. at 59 (“[I]f one of them [fear or love] has to be lacking, it is much safer to be 
feared than loved.”). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See Melissa K. Mathews, The Imperial Presidency: An Examination of President Bush’s 
New Emergency Powers, 23 HAMLINE J. PUB. L & POL’Y 455, 457–58 (2002) (describing the  
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I am skeptical about this conventional wisdom, which essentially 
holds that Machiavelli was correct that it is better to be feared than 
loved. Rather, I believe that there is something to be said for 
accommodation, even from the perspective of the President. The 
Presidency of George W. Bush provides an excellent vehicle for 
assessing Machiavelli’s question. It is clear the Bush Administration 
chose to be feared rather than loved, which is to say it governed using 
the unilateral, confrontational model. 
A few examples are illustrative: First, the Bush Administration 
followed its own view of how best to proceed regarding detainee 
treatment. Administration officials deliberated only among 
themselves: not publicly and not with Congress. The Administration 
did not go to Congress to seek legal authorization for its policies and 
programs. Rather, the Administration unilaterally decided how enemy 
combatants would be treated and, in fact, asserted that it was the 
President’s prerogative alone, impervious to review by either 
Congress or the courts.6 Eventually, Congress passed the Military 
Commissions Act,7 which gave the President the authority to conduct 
military commissions in precisely the manner the President had 
previously ordered. So one might regard the President’s assertion of 
power as a useless exercise: he could have been accommodationist 
and still received the authority he wanted. But the President’s strategy 
was aimed at a different goal. The President followed the unilateral 
model not simply to establish the kinds of military commissions he 
wanted, but also to vindicate his broad theory of unilateral 
presidential power. 
Second, the warrantless surveillance program, also known as the 
Terrorist Surveillance Program,8 was adopted completely in secret. Its 
 
pro-Congress view, which relies on Constitutional language that explicitly provides that 
Congress and the President make decisions in war, and the pro-Executive view, which 
emphasizes the “take care” clause and the Constitutional grant of the Executive’s Commander-
in-Chief power to justify the President’s special role in times of war). 
 6. This view is set forth most succinctly in President Bush’s signing statement on the 
McCain Amendment, which prohibited military personnel from inflicting “cruel, inhuman, and 
degrading treatment” on enemy combatants. See Statement on Signing Department of Defense, 
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and 
Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006, 41 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 52 (Dec. 30, 2005), available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=65259. The Administration also argued 
essentially this position to the Supreme Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) and in 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
 7. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e). 
 8. See Constitutional Limitations on Domestic Surveillance: Hearing on Warrantless 
Surveillance and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Before the H. Comm. of the Judiciary, 
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existence eventually was leaked, and a tremendous controversy 
followed.9 Members of Congress loudly objected but then largely 
capitulated in authorizing the President’s program.10 
Third, the 2006 mid-term election can be understood as a public 
repudiation of the President’s position on the war in Iraq. The 
contemporaneous report of the Iraq Study Group strongly urged a 
different, scaled back strategy in Iraq.11 The President nonetheless 
responded to this public repudiation by ordering a troop surge.12 Here 
again, President Bush acted unilaterally and without regard for the 
views of Congress or the public. 
Fourth, when the Bush Administration announced its initial 
bailout plan for the financial industry, it submitted the plan to 
Congress, an action that may appear accommodationist.13 But the 
plan’s content was largely unilateral. In essence, President Bush asked 
Congress for $700 billion to spend as he saw fit and without oversight 
or accountability. Ultimately, Congress approved the plan, but only 
after demanding provisions for oversight, limits on executive pay for 
participating companies, and a governmental ownership stake in 
return for its investments.14 
Finally, President Bush’s use of signing statements is consistent 
with the view that the President may unilaterally decide what policies 
are in the best interest of the nation and what course to pursue.15 
 
110th Cong. 76 (2007). The program authorized the NSA to monitor—without prior FISC or 
other court approval—phone calls and other communications where the NSA believed one 
party to the communication was affiliated with Al Qaeda and outside the United States, even if 
it was possible that the other party resided in the United States. 
 9. See James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts,  
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2005), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/ 
16program.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=Bush_Lets_U.S._Spy_on_Callers_without_Courts&st=cse. 
 10. See The Protect America Act, Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat 552 (Aug. 5, 2007)  
(Congress approving warrantless surveillance of persons believed to be outside the United 
States); The FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat 2436 (July 10, 2008) 
(same). 
 11. JAMES A. BAKER III & LEE H. HAMILTON ET AL., THE IRAQ STUDY GROUP REPORT 
31, 32–62 (2006), available at http://www.usip.org/isg/iraq_study_group_report/report/1206/. 
 12. See Michael R. Gordon, Troop ‘Surge’ Took Place Amid Doubt and Debate, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 30, 2008), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/31/washington/ 
31military.html?fta=y. 
 13. Eamonn K. Moran, Wall Street Meets Main Street: Understanding the Financial Crisis, 
13 N.C. BANKING INST. 5, 78 (2009). 
 14. Press Room, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, HP-1207, Treasury Announces TARP Capital 
Purchase Program Description (2008), 2008 WL 4562242. 
 15. For a compilation of the constitutionally based objections contained in President 
Bush’s signing statements, see Peter Shane & Neil Kinkopf, Index of Presidential Signing 
Statements 2001–2007, 1 ADVANCE 3 supp. (2006), available at http://www.acslaw.org/node/5309. 
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Taken together, they demonstrate contempt for the idea that 
Congress through law may bind the President.16 The best and most 
notorious example is “the Torture Memo,”17 which addressed whether 
the President could order the use of torture to interrogate enemy 
combatants. 
A treaty, the Convention Against Torture,18 binds signatory nations 
(including the United States) to refrain from employing torture.19 In 
addition, the Anti-Torture Statute makes it a federal crime for United 
States personnel to engage in torture outside of the United States.20 
The Office of Legal Counsel, nevertheless, issued a memorandum 
claiming that either the statute prohibiting the use of torture does not 
apply or, if it does apply, that the statute is unconstitutional because 
Congress cannot regulate or limit the President’s choice of 
interrogation techniques in the War on Terror.21 The memorandum 
asserts that Congress has no authority in this area, even though the 
Constitution specifically grants Congress the power to define and 
punish offenses against the laws of nations,22 which is what the Anti-
Torture statute aims to do.23 
The Constitution gives Congress authority to make rules for the 
“Government and Regulation” of the military24 and to provide for 
captures on land and at sea.25 All of these powers are obviously 
 
 16. Neil Kinkopf, Signing Statements and the President’s Authority to Refuse to Enforce the 
Law, 1 ADVANCE 3 (2006). 
 17. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., RE: Standards of Conduct for 
Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A, to Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the President 
(Aug. 1, 2002) in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB (Karen J. Greenberg & 
Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005), also available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/etn/ 
gonzales/memos_dir/memo_20020801_JD_%20Gonz_.pdf. 
 18. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, Open for Signature Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, available at 
http://www.hrweb.org/legal/cat.html. 
 19. The United States has signed the Convention Against Torture, but has not yet ratified 
it. 
 20. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A. 
 21. For an annotated copy of the “Terror Memo,” see http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/ 
cia_3686_001.pdf. 
 22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (granting Congress the power “To define and punish 
piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations”). 
 23. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A. By both defining torture and establishing offenders 
under its jurisdiction as both “nationals” and those “present in the United States,” Congress was 
obviously asserting its authority in this area. 
 24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14 (granting Congress the power “To make Rules for the 
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces”). 
 25. Id. at cl. 11 (granting Congress the power “To declare war, grant letters of marquee and 
reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water”). 
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relevant sources of authority for Congress’ power in this area, but the 
Bush Administration’s Justice Department was so contemptuous of 
the idea that Congress could have any war-related authority that its 
memo does not even acknowledge them. 
The view expressed in the Torture Memo is fundamentally 
incompatible with our constitutional system. Decisions about matters 
such as whether we should use torture, and if so, under what 
circumstances, are decisions that define us as a nation. They are 
therefore decisions that ought to come from a process of deliberation 
and approval through the constitutional method of bicameralism and 
presentment.26 They are not decisions to be made alone and in secret 
by the President. In this respect, the model of presidential power 
employed during the Bush Administration affronted our nation’s 
system of checks and balances, democratic accountability, and 
republican notions of deliberation. 
For two reasons, the Torture Memo does not appear to have been 
an aberration. First, the Administration executed a memorandum that 
withdrew the Torture Memo after it was leaked. In the section dealing 
with the President’s power, the memorandum withdrawing the 
Torture Memo explained that the whole discussion of torture was 
dicta because the President had ordered that torture not be used. The 
withdrawing memorandum did not disclaim the substance of the legal 
analysis contained in the Torture Memo, but instead only 
characterized it as dicta.27 Why did the withdrawing memorandum not 
accept that the Torture Memo’s legal analysis was wrong? Likely 
because the Administration did not believe that it was: after all, we 
know at least one other program, the Terrorist Surveillance Program,28 
relied on the same model of unchecked presidential power. Second, a 
review of the signing statements that President Bush issued relating to 
signing statements discloses a theory of presidential power that can 
 
 26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (“Every bill which shall have passed the House of 
Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a law, be presented to the President of 
the United States . . . .”). 
 27. See Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A, Op. Att’y Gen.  
(Dec. 30, 2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/18usc23402340a2.htm (“Because the 
discussion in that memorandum concerning the President’s Commander-in-Chief power and the 
potential defenses to liability was—and remains—unnecessary, it has been eliminated from the 
analysis that follows. Consideration of the bounds of any such authority would be inconsistent 
with the President’s unequivocal directive that United States personnel not engage in torture.”). 
 28. See Attorney General & Principle Deputy Director of National Intelligence,  
Press Briefing of Dec. 19, 2005, available at http://www.dni.gov/20051219_release.htm 
(recognizing and debriefing some aspects of the Terrorist Surveillance Program). 
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only be justified on the same expansive, unilateral grounds that are set 
forth in the Torture Memo.29 
So the Bush Administration seems clearly to have chosen fear 
over love, confrontation and unilateralism over cooperation. But at 
least by one telling, the story has a happy ending. According to this 
version of recent history, the Bush view was repudiated and the 
correct approach of accommodation prevailed. The first hero of this 
story is the Supreme Court, which rejected unilateralism in a series of 
opinions starting with Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,30 then Rasul v. Bush,31 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,32 and finally Boumediene v. Bush.33 Moreover, 
the public also rejected the Bush Administration’s view of 
presidential power by electing Barack Obama. No more fear-based 
view of presidential power; which is to say, the public has rejected 
Machiavelli. 
Jack Goldsmith, who headed the Office of Legal Counsel for 
almost a year in the Bush Administration and who fought valiantly 
during his tenure to uphold the rule of law within the executive 
branch, has written a brilliant memoir about his government service—
The Terror Presidency.34 In his account, he draws the conclusion that 
the President’s approach to executive power ultimately and inevitably 
failed.35 
Goldsmith claims that even if the war in Iraq had gone well, the 
President and the President’s approach would have failed because he 
focused too much on “hard power”—the powers mentioned in the 
text of the Constitution, such as the Presidents power as commander 
in chief, the veto power, and the pardon power—and not enough on 
the President’s “soft power”—the power of the bully pulpit, the power 
to persuade people, to lead the nation in deliberation, to gain consent 
 
 29. See Kinkopf, supra note 15 (analyzing the legal foundation of President Bush’s signing 
statements). 
 30. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (recognizing governmental authority to detain 
enemy combatants, but requiring that U.S. citizens have an opportunity to challenge their 
detention before an impartial judge). 
 31. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2006) (holding that U.S. courts have jurisdiction to hear 
wrongful imprisonment challenges of non-citizens held at Guantanamo Bay). 
 32. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (holding that the military commissions 
established by the Bush Administration to try detainees at Guantanamo Bay violated the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Geneva Convention). 
 33. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008) (finding that the Military Commissions Act 
of 2006 unconstitutionally restricted Guantanamo Bay prisoners’ right to habeas corpus review). 
 34. JACK L. GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY (2007). 
 35. Id. at 205–16. 
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and consensus for the policies and programs that the President would 
then ultimately pursue.36 The Bush Administration, says Professor 
Goldsmith, has rejected an approach relying on the President’s soft 
powers in favor of a unilateral approach that did not engage in 
deliberation but that simply looked every four years for ratification.37 
And, because that is contrary to our fundamental commitment to 
democracy and to civic republican values, it was bound to fail.38 That is 
our happy ending. 
I agree with Professor Goldsmith’s argument, drawn from the 
work of historians and political scientists like Arthur Schlesinger, that 
at least in our polity, Machiavelli is wrong.39 Even from the standpoint 
of presidential power, it is better for the President to adopt an 
accommodationist model, rather than a unilateral and confrontational 
model. But the claim that the unilateral model approach is bound to 
fail is an unduly optimistic assertion. 
One reason unilateralism is not bound to fail is that Congress is 
not a reliable check against presidential power. Congress capitulated 
on military commissions, on domestic surveillance, and on the surge in 
Iraq. Congress also largely capitulated on the bailout bill. Although 
the bailout bill Congress ultimately enacted included a few modest 
measures for oversight, Congress basically gave the Administration 
what it wanted.40 
But why doesn’t Congress stand up as a check on the President? 
Madison’s view, expressed in The Federalist and in the structure of the 
Constitution, was that parchment barriers and legal constraints on 
power would not be worth the parchment on which they were 
written.41 Madison argued that the way to constrain power was to 
 
 36. Id. at 205. 
 37. See id. at 205–06, 209–10, 215 (repeatedly noting the Bush Administration’s unilateral 
action). 
 38. See id. at 205–13 (recognizing how a presidential administration’s soft powers are 
crucial to the administration’s success and how the Bush Administration focused solely on its 
hard powers). 
 39. See, e.g., id. at 213 (“[T]he ‘truly strong President is not the one who relies on his power 
to command but the one who recognizes his responsibility, and opportunity, to enlighten and 
pursuade.’” (quoting Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., War and the Constitution: Abraham Lincoln 
and Franklin D. Roosevelt, in LINCOLN, THE WAR PRESIDENT: THE GETTYSBURG LECTURES 
145, 174 (Gabor S. Boritt ed., 1992))). 
 40. See generally Emergency Economic Stabilization—Energy Improvement and 
Extension—Tax Extenders and Alternative Minimum Tax Relief, Pub. L. No. 110-343,  
122 Stat. 3765 (2008) (bill passed by Congress to attempt to redress America’s economic crisis). 
 41. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 274 (James Madison) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898);  
see also, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (granting to the House of Representatives the “sole 
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structure government so that each institution would have its own 
ambition, which would counteract the ambitions of the others.42 Thus, 
Madison envisioned Congress’ institutional ambitions counteracting 
the power of the Executive Branch.43 
But Madison’s idealistic system of checks and balances relies on 
institutional loyalty, which does not take into account party loyalty.44 
Congressional members who want to get reelected, if they are from 
the President’s own party, pursue their own ambition and self-interest 
by making sure the President is successful.45 Thus, these self-interested 
members are less likely to check the President’s power than Madison 
envisioned.46 Otherwise, the public would lose confidence in the 
President’s decisions and in the political party he represents, which 
could cause Congress to change hands and which disserves the self-
serving congressional party members. While this dynamic is 
important, for the last two years, we have had congressional majorities 
from a different party than the President. And yet Congress still has 
not acted as a significant check on presidential power. Why not? 
The Executive Branch enjoys three formidable institutional 
advantages that have undermined the capacity of Congress to act as a 
check on the President. First, the Executive Branch houses nearly all 
of the government’s expertise and knowledge. This resides in the 
agencies of the federal government, and they are under the control of 
the President. So the Executive Branch controls the information 
collected by agencies and can, and over the last eight years certainly 
has, manipulated that information by disclosing what is useful and 
withholding what is not.47  
 
Power of Impeachment”); id. at art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (giving the Senate the power to try 
impeachments); id. at art I, § 8 (enumerating the powers of Congress). 
 42. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 286 (James Madison) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898). 
 43. See id. 
 44. Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. 
L. REV. 2311, 2316–25 (2006). 
 45. See id. at 2319 (congressmen, instead of having ambitions that compete with the 
President’s, form “incipient organizations that t[ake] sides on contested policy and ideological 
issues” and compete to “marshal support for their agendas,” which leads to “the organization of 
enduring parties that . . . facilitate alliances among groups of like-minded elected officials and 
politically mobilized citizens on a national scale.”). 
 46. Id. at 2323–24. 
 47. See, e.g., Sidney A. Shapiro, “Political” Science: Regulatory Science After the Bush 
Administration, 4 Duke J. Const. L. & Pub. Pol’y 31, 31–33 (2009) (discussing the Bush 
Administration’s manipulation of information collected and released by government agencies). 
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Second, members of the House of Representatives are perpetually 
campaigning for reelection, and therefore the institution is chronically 
distracted. Members of the House of Representatives have to run for 
reelection every two years and must constantly fundraise and 
campaign. They never stop running, so they always have one foot in 
their home district to campaign, and the other foot back in 
Washington to engage in policy deliberations. But that is a serious 
disadvantage. The demands of campaigning seriously impair the 
ability of even conscientious legislators to engage in continuing, 
rather than sporadic, oversight. 
A third factor that is sometimes undervalued is a competing 
ambition of many members of Congress. Their ambition is not to be 
powerful as members of Congress or as part of a coequal institution 
that checks the President’s power, but to be powerful period. Ten 
senators considered running for President this time around, plus 
several Representatives.48 So what position should these presidential 
hopefuls take while serving in the Congress? Because they may hold 
the Executive Office in the near future, they may be unwilling to limit 
the President’s powers that they themselves may hope someday to 
employ. It is unlikely that Congress can act as a check on presidential 
power when so many of its members hope to one day hold the office 
of President, or would be happy to give up their current job to serve 
in a President’s cabinet. 
Members of Congress themselves realize this. Senator Carl Levin 
was asked how Congress could check the President’s power.49 His 
answer was “‘[w]e need a Democrat in the White House.’”50 It was not, 
“There is a lot we can do here in Congress, we can hold hearings and 
we can enact legal regimes to prohibit or at least inhibit excesses.” 
Fortunately, even before the public rejected the Bush 
Administration’s model of unilateralism by electing President Obama, 
the Court did the same.51 The Hamdi decision—the first in the recent 
line of decisions checking presidential power—is interesting for when 
 
 48. See, e.g., Susan Page, President’s Job Gets Harder When 10 Senators Want It,  
USA TODAY, July 27, 2007, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2005-07-27-
president-job-harder-campaign-08_x.htm (listing senators who indicated interest in running for 
presidency). 
 49. Jonathan Mahler, After the Imperial Presidency, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 9, 2008, 
available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=940DE4DA1F3BF93AA35752C1A 
96E9C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=11. 
 50. Id. (quoting Senator Carl Levin). 
 51. See supra notes 30–33. 
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it was decided. After the case was argued, but before it was decided, 
the revelation of photographs of Abu Ghraib and the leak of the 
Torture Memo became public.52 What the Court would have said had 
those events not occurred is sheer speculation. But it is not far-fetched 
to believe that they had some effect on the way the Court looked at 
the issues in that case and at the issues that came up in the later cases. 
But even setting that aside, the most recent case, Boumediene v. 
Bush,53 finally declared that enemy combatants detained at 
Guantanamo Bay are entitled to petition for a writ of habeas corpus.54 
Yet it took over six years after the beginning of the War on Terror 
merely to establish this fairly preliminary point, and Boumediene still 
does not tell us what rights are guaranteed under the Great Writ. In 
the seven years of the President’s unilateral authorization of enemy 
combatant detainment, the judiciary has not begun to address these 
questions. So what kind of constraint has the Court really put on 
presidential power? 
According to the happy-ending version of the story, the public 
repudiated fear by electing Barack Obama. Perhaps, but what would 
have happened if the war in Iraq had gone differently? What if 
inspectors had found weapons of mass destruction loaded onto a 
cargo ship? What would have happened if we had captured Osama 
bin Laden? The public’s view of executive power might look very 
different than it does now. 
Given this uncertainty, how should presidential powers be 
checked? It is possible that structural safeguards could have some 
effect. On the occasions when Congress has been able to stand up 
effectively to the President, it has enacted structural constraints; that 
is, legal constraints on the exercise of presidential power. For example, 
after the Civil War, Congress enacted the Tenure in Office Act55 and 
adopted the Civil Service System.56 These measures served as effective 
 
 52. Boumediene v. Bush was argued on December 5, 2007, whereas the Torture Memo was 
leaked in 2004. See Dana Priest & R. Jeffrey Smith, Memo Offered Justification for Use of 
Torture: Justice Dept Gave Advice in 2002, WASH. POST, June 8, 2004, at A1, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A23373-2004Jun7.html (Washington Post’s first 
article regarding the Torture Memo). 
 53. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
 54. Id. at 2277. 
 55. An Act Regulating the Tenure of Certain Civil Offices, 14 Stat. 430 (1867)  
(repealed 1887). 
 56. An Act To Regulate and Improve the Civil Service of the United States, 22 Stat. 403 
(1883). 
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constraints on some abuses of presidential power, at least until the 
Tenure in Office Act was partly repudiated.57 
Watergate, however, provides a cautionary example. In the wake 
of that scandal, a wave of reforms swept over Washington. Congress 
enacted a vast array of legislation to prevent executive abuses of 
power.58 Yet here we are thirty years later, worrying about the same 
issues. In light of this history, it is not surprising that Senator Levin 
would think not of legislation but of politics as the most effective 
check against the abuse of power. 
It is tempting to consider the lesson of the Bush Administration to 
be that unilateral attempts to expand executive power are doomed to 
fail. But it is important not to indulge this myth because doing so will 
only further diminish the capacity of the public and other government 
institutions to check against abuses in the future. 
 
 
 57. An Act to Repeal Certain Sections of the Revised Statutes of the United States 
Relating to the Appointment of Civil Officers, 24 Stat. 500 (1887); see also Myers v. United 
States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (finding Tenure in Office Act unconstitutional as violating principles 
of separation of powers). 
 58. See, e.g., Thomas E. Harris, Implementing the Federal Campaign Finance Laws,  
67 NAT’L CIVIC REV. 217 (1978) (discussing the campaign finance reform as well as the public 
ethics legislation responding to the Watergate scandal). 
